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16 Abstract
This report presents fracture mechanics analysis results from the following structures/components analyzed
at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) between 1982 and 1989: space shuttle main engine (SSME), Hubble
Space Telescope (HST), external tank attach ring, B-I stand LOX inner tank, and solid rocket booster (SRB).
Results from the SSME high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) second stage blade parametric analysis determined
a critical flaw size for a wide variety of stress intensity values. The engine 0212 failure analysis was a time-
dependent fracture life assessment. Results indicated that the disk ruptured due to an overspeed condition. Results
also indicated that very small flaws in the curvic coupling area could propagate and lead to failure under normal
operating conditions. It was strongly recommended that a nondestructive evaluation inspection schedule be
implemented. The main ring of the HST, scheduled to launch in 1990, was analyzed by safe-life and fail-safe
analyses. First safe-life inspection criteria curves for the ring inner and outer skins and the fore and aft channels
were derived. Afterwards the skins and channels were determined to be fail-safe by analysis. A conservative safe-
life analysis was done on the 270 redesign external tank attach ring. Results from the analysis were used to
determine the nondestructive evaluation technique required. A leak before burst analysis of the B-1 stand LOX
inner tank indicated that leakage would be detected well before burst conditions developed.
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COMPENDIUM OF FRACTURE MECHANICS PROBLEMS
I. INTRODUCTION
The structural analysis sector of Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has been inw_lved in
solving a variety of fracture mechanics analysis problems throughout the years. This report high-
lights some of the interesting and challenging fracture mechanics problems analyzed by MSFC
engineers and their contractors.
1: has been the policy of NASA and MSFC to provide safe space flight structures. The
structural integrity of space flight hardware is established by a combination of qualification tests
and analyses which simulate actual operating conditions, including flight loads, temperatures, and
corrosive environments.
It is required that if structural failure of a part in a space vehicle system would cause a
catastrophic event, then that part must be subjected to fracture control. Fracture control is a process
v+'hich eliminates or controls the conditions under which cracks are tolerated and is based on frac-
ture mechanics. Fracture mechanics is an engineering discipline that quantifies the conditions under
which a structure can fail due to growth of a crack contained in that body. It provides an analytical
tool for assessing defect acceptability.
II. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this report is to provide the engineer working in the fracture mechanics
discipline a guideline as well as a reference for working a variety of fracture mechanics
problems. Often textbook and manual examples do not depict real-world situations or conditions.
Tbe problems highlighted in this report were analyzed from real-time conditions. Some of the
problems are taken from fracture mechanics analyses of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST}, space
shuttle main engines (SSME), and solid rocket boosters (SRB).
Ul. APPROACH
The parts highlighted in this report have been classified as fracture sensitive. Fracture sengi-
live paris must be dispositioned by one of the following methods: low mass, contained/restrained,
fail-safe, damage tolerant, or safe life. The major emphasis of this paper is on parts classified as
fail-safe or sate life.
t
A. Fail-Safe
MSFC-HI)BK-1453 defines a part as fail-safe if it can be shown by analysis or test that,
due to structural redundancy, the structure remaining after failure of the one part can sustain the
limit loads with an ultimate factor of safety equal to or greater than one, and the remaining struc-
ture has sufficient fatigue life to complete the mission [1].
B. Safe Life
A metallic or glass part is defined by MSFC-HDBK-1453 as safe life if it can be shown
that the largest undetected flaw that could exist in the part will not grow to failure when subjected
to the cyclic and sustained loads and environments encountered in four complete mission lifetimes.
All structures and parts classified as safe life require a fracture mechanics analysis and
nondestructive evaluation (NDE) to ensure that no flaws (cracks) exist that will grow to critical size
in four lifetimes [!].
The following computer codes were used for safe life analysis problems highlighted in this
paper:
NASCRAC - NASA Crack Analysis Code developed by Failure Analysis Associates
(FaAA) under contract to MSFC. NASCRAC uses influence functions to generate stress intensity
solutions [2].
NASA/FLAGRO - Fatigue crack growth computer program that provides an automated
procedure for calculating the fatigue life of cyclically loaded structures with initial crack-like
defects [31.
FLAGRO4 - Developed by Rockwell International for fracture control analysis of the space
shuttle [4].
IV. MSFC POLICY
All space flight structures and components shall be examined to determine their fracture
control requirements. All parts shall undergo an evaluation as shown in Figure 1. The criteria for
selecting parts for fracture control are based on safety rather than mission success. A determination
must be made for all parts as to whether or not their structural failure will cause a catastrophic
event. Any structural failure must be assumed to lead to a catastrophic event unless it can be
shown otherwise. The exit "no" path (Fig. 1) may be chosen for those parts which are clearly low
mass, contained/restrained, or fail-safe. The exit "yes" path must be chosen for all other parts. The
parts in the "yes" path are termed fracture sensitive and they must be dispositioned by rigorous
analyses and/or tests. At MSFC, fracture mechanics analysis is done in accordance with MSFC-
HDBK-1453 "Fracture Control Program Requirements" and MSFC-STD-1249 "Standard NDE












































For safe-life analysis, a safety factor of four is required. The factor of four was selected to
account for typical scatter in fatigue crack growth rate data. The factor was determined after a
statistical study of several different materials. A single variable analysis of the growth rate constant
C indicates that C multiplied by four was approximately equal to a 2o- variation and adequately
bounded the growth rate data. Also, comparisons of life predictions with numerous cycles to failure
tests have shown that the factor of four was conservative. If a part has less than a safety factor of
four on life there are several options for disposition:
1. Conduct more precise load, stress, and spectrum analyses.
2. Monitor structural or system testing to obtain refined loads.
3. Verify safe life with fracture mechanics oriented component tests.
4. Apply specially designed inspection procedures to disclose smaller flaws.
5. Apply periodic reinspection or replacement.
6. Apply stress-intensity factor reduction methods.
7. Wave requirements, where specifically justified, such as improbability of certain flaw
orientations based on a review of manufacturing processes.
8. Redesign part according to fracture mechanics recommendations [6].
At MSFC, the Fracture Control Board (FCB) is responsible for ensuring preparation, main-
tenance, review, and approval of all fracture control plans, procedures, and requirements. The FCB
oversees all projects at MSFC. Within each project, the technical leads, chief engineers, and
project offices are responsible for implementing fracture control as required by MSFC-HDBK-1453
and for carrying out FCB directives [i].
V. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
What is the residual strength of a structure as a function of crack size? What is the
maximum permissible crack size that a structure can tolerate? How long does it take for a crack to
grow from its initial size to the maximum permissible size? What is the service life of a structure
when a certain preexisting flaw size is assumed to exist? How often should a structure be inspected
lot cracks'? Fracture mechanics can provide quantitative answers to questions involving crack-like
flaws in structures. Fracture mechanics is the study of the failure of load-bearing structures by frac-
ture before general yielding occurs in the net section due to the presence of a crack-like flaw. The
use of high strength-to-weight ratios in the design of space structures has stimulated a keen interest
in fracture mechanics 171.
in 1920, A.A. Griffith successfully analyzed the fracture-dominant problem of propagation
of brittle cracks in glass. Griffith formulated an energy balance between the decrease in elastic
strainenergyof a body understressasthe crackextendsand the-energyneededto createthe new
cracksurfaces.In the 1950's,G. Irwin determinedthat the Griffith energybalancemust be
betweenthe storedstrainenergyof a stressedbody and the surfaceenergyplus the work done by
plasticdelormationon the body. For relatively ductile materials,Irwin statedthat the energy
requiredlo form new crack surfacesis very small comparedto the work of plasticdeformation.
Irwin defineda materialpropertyknown ascrack driving force or energyreleaserate, G, asthe
total energyabsorbedduring crackingperunit increasein crack lengthand per unit thickness.In
1957,Irwin postulatedthat fractureoccurswhena critical stressdistribution aheadof the cracktip
is reached.Irwin equatedhis stressintensity approachto the energyapproachof Griffith. The
materialproperty,G_.,the critical energyreleaserate, hasanequivalentcritical stressintensity fac-
tor, K_. The ability to work in termsof stressintensity insteadof energyreleaserate is the basis
of Linear ElasticFractureMechanics(LEFM). The stressintensityfactor K is the fundamental
parameterusedto characterizecrackextension.
The stressintensity factor givesthe magnitudeof the elasticstressfield in the region near
th_ crack_ipas:
K = _r X/'v-aaf :(_-)
where
_r = stressat a given location,
a -- flaw size,
f(a/W) = parameterdependingon geometryand crackorientation.
Dimensionalanalysisshowsthat K must be linearly related to stress and related to the
square root of crack length. Irwin stated that the stresses in the vicinity of the crack tip are:
K
cr, i -- fij(0) +
W_-_vr
where r and 0 are the polar coordinates of a point with respect to the crack tip. As r tends to zero,
the stresses become infinite; a stress singularity exists at the crack tip. In reality, structural
materials deform plastically above the yield stress so that a plastic zone surrounds the crack tip.
When the plastic zone is small compared to the flaw size, the stress field of the cracked body is
closcly approximated by the above equation. For subcritical crack growth, where crack extension
takes place at stress intensities well below K_., the stress intensity approach can provide correlations
of data for fatigue crack growth.
Stressintensity solutionshave beendevelopedfor variousgeometries.For the centercracked
tensionspecimenin Figure 2, the modeI (openingmode)stressintensity factor Kv canbe written:
Kv = cr X/_a X/sec (rra/W)
This equationwasdevelopedas an approximationby Feddersenin 1966. Numerousothersolutions
for this geometryexist. Other practicalgeometriesareshownin Figure 2, alongwith the
correspondingstressintensity solution.
For a crack throughthe thicknessof a wide platesubjectedto remoteloadingthat varies
cyclically betweena minimum and a maximumvalue, the stressrangeis Act = trmax - O'min, and
the stress intensity range is AK = Kmax - Krnin or AK = Act V"_wa.
The change in stress intensity is a controlling parameter in fatigue crack growth rate
(FCGR). The FCGR is defined as crack extension during a small number of cycles and is written
as the derivative da/dN. Experimentally, it has been found that for a given stress ratio, R = cr,,i,/
cr,,,_x, da/dN is a function of AK. The functional relationship between da/dN and stress intensity
range and stress ratio exists lor specimens tested with different stress ranges and crack lengths, as
well as specimens of different geometry. This correlation can be shown graphically on a double
logarithmic plot (Fig. 3). The crack growth rate curve usually has a sigmoidal trend.
The sigmoidal trend of a da/dN-AK curve divides the curve into three regions according to
curve shape, crack growth mechanisms, and other influences. In region I, a threshold value of AK
occurs. The crack will not grow after Ag,-drops below this threshold. Just above AKo, the crack
propagation rate increases rapidly with increasing AK. Crack growth rate in this region is influ-
enced by microstructure, mean stress, and environment. Region II is characterized by a near-linear
log-log relationship between da/dN and AK; this region is influenced largely by certain combina-
tions of environment, mean stress, and frequency. Microstructure and thickness have little influence
on the crack growth of region II. In region III, the crack growth rate rises to an infinite slope
caused when the maximum stress intensity factor, Kmax, becomes equal to the critical stress
intensity factor, Kc. For mode 1 loading, Kc is denoted as Kl_ (or as Kn_) and is known as the frac-
ture toughness. Microstructure, mean stress, and thickness are large influences on the crack growth
rate in this region.
Since no known physical law governs FCGR, attempts to describe the crack growth rate
curve using empirical formulas fitted to a set of data have been widespread. In 1962, Paris used
crack growth rate data obtained from specimens with different stress ratios and developed an empir-
ical crack growth law:
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Figure 3. Typical fatigue crack growth rate curve.
C and n are empirical coefficients which are constants for a given material. This simple power
function describes only the linear region of the crack propagation curve. In 1967, Forman argued
that the value of da/dN approaches infinity as the crack approaches its critical length; in terms of"
the stress intensity factor, as K,,,a,, approaches KI,:. This behavior can be described as follows:
da - C (AK)" K,,la,,
dN Kic-K,l,,,x
By taking K,,,_,,, into account, Forman's equation describes regions II and II1. The significance of
these equations is limited, but they can provide estimates of crack growth behavior, especially if
region !1 linearity exists over a wide range of crack growth rates.
The Paris equation directly accounts for the effects of AK on da/dN for a given R. In addi-
tion to AK and R, the Forman equation accounts for the effect of Kit on fatigue crack growth ratc.
t_c_wever, many other factors which influence fatigue crack growth are accounted for in the empiri-
cal coefficients used in the previously stated equations for crack growth rate. Other equations, such
as the modified F_wman ecuation, the hyberbolic sine equation, and the Collipriest equation exist.
Ft_tigue crack growth is affected by a countless number of parameters and many of these factors
interact with each other. Engineering judgment must decide what effects are dominant influences on
the crack growth rate for each individual problem [8,9].
Vh ANALYSIS CODES
Currently two types of computer codes for solving fracture mechanics analysis problems,
NASA/FLAGRO and NASCRAC, are being used by fracture analysts at MSFC.
NASA/FLAGRO (commonly known as NASGRO) became available in 1986 from the
NASA Johnson Space Center. The program was developed under the guidance of the NASA Frac-
ture Control Analytical Methodology Panel and contains stress intensity factor solutions to a
.,,umber of commonly used crack geometries. Service life calculations are performed with the mod-
ified Forman equation which reduces to the Walker or Paris equation depending on material
constants used.
NASA/FLAGRO is menu driven and prompts the user for information in a serial manner.
After selecting the type of analysis desired, such as safe life, the user answers a series of questions
and enters data depending on the particular path taken. Generally, the program operates serially,
requiring the user to follow the same path and answer a number of basic questions before each
cxecution.
NASCRAC was developed by Failure Analysis Associates under contract to MSFC.
NASCRAC can perform time and/or cycle dependent analysis of subcritical crack growth and






NASCRAC is menu-driven which makes it very easy for the analyst to input data and
obtain results. The code contains a wide variety of stress intensity factor solutions. Many _t the
stress intensity factor solutions in NASCRAC are based on influence functions. The subcritical
crack growth analysis portion of the code is tailored primarily for fatigue crack growth although
time-dependencies, such as introduced by hold times and various cyclic loading frequencies, can
also be analyzed. Several fatigue crack growth laws such as Paris, Forman, Walker, Collipriest,
etc., are included in the code. Load interactions are accounted for by a variety of user-selected
models, including the Wheeler and Willenborg treatments. Final crack instability is treated by
exceedance of a critical value of the stress intensity factor. Figure 4 diagrams the types of analysis
contained in the code [2].
VII. ANALYSIS PROBLEMS
The following problems are from fracture mechanics analysis problems solved in the past 8
years (1982-1989) by the fracture mechanics sector at MSFC. The problems are from SSME, HST,
SSE, SRB, and the B-I LOX stand. The problems highlighted are intended to be used as a guide
so that the reader may acquire a working knowledge of how to solve real-time fracture mechanics
analysis problems.
A. SSME High Pressure Fuel Turbopump Turbine Engine Cracking
The SSME high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) turbine is a two-stage reaction turbine
with curvic-coupled rotors powered with 5,500 psi hydrogen-rich steam generated by a fuel
prcburncr producing hot gas temperatures near 2,000 R (I ,540 °F). Gaseous hydrogcn flows as
coolant beneath the platform, passing between the blades and disk in the firtree area at 140 R
(-320 °F) on the first stage and 1,400 R (940 °F) on the second stage. Figure 5 shows a cross
section of the turbine.
At full power level (FPL) (109 percent of rated power level), the machine produces some
74,000 horsepower while rotating at 36,595 rpm. With 63 blades on the first stage rotor and 59
blades on the second stage rotor, this translates to over 600 hp per blade. The SSME HPFTP first
and second stage blades (Fig. 6) have historically experienced a large variation in types and loca-
tions of cracks [I 11.
Figures 7 and 8 show the blade with symmetrical rotor plot and blade/rotor model, respec-
tively. Figure 9 shows a variety of second stage blade cracks.
A fracture mechanics analysis was done on the crack at the transverse downstream firtree
face (Fig. 9f) of the second stage blade.
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1. Stress Information
A crack in the area of neck 3 (Fig. 10) was analyzed. The stresses were obtained from an
ANSYS three-dimensional finite element model (row of 30 equally spaced elements along the
firtree longitudinal axis, i.e., into paper in Figure 10). The top curve of Figure 11 depicts the max-
imum stress at any given station along the firtree axis. The bottom curve depicts the average
stresses at any given station along the firtree axis.
NOTE: In order to accurately analyze this problem, the analyst should pick the stresses from the
curves in Figure I1 corresponding to x distances from center to center of the 30 equally spaced
elements from 0 to 1.06 in.
2. Material Properties
The blades are made of MAR-M246. An "a versus K" solution was initiated to determine a
critical crack size for the second stage blade, therefore crack growth constants were not required.
The critical stress intensity factor K is needed in this type of analysis. At the time of the analysis,
the K value had not been determined, therefore a curve was drawn (one curve using the maximum
stresses across the section and the other using the average stress across the section), and a critical
crack size tk)r the blade could be determined for any range of K values.
3. Solution Model
The crack was assumed to have propagated all the way across the face shown in Figures
12, 13, and 14 and is growing from the trailing edge to the leading edge. The NASCRAC compu-
ter code was used in this analysis. A conservative analysis was done using the through edge crack
model in Figure 12. The width (W) = 1.06 in.
4. Results
As stated above, the curves in Figures 13 and 14 were used to determine the critical flaw
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Figure 14. HPFFP K versus a curve for o'av_.
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B. Engine 0212 Failure Investigation
High Pressure Oxygen Turbopump (HPOTP) First Stage Disk
Fracture Mechanics Analysis
Test 904-044 was prematurely shutdown at 1,270.7 seconds into a planned 1,338-seccmd
test. The first-stage disk was found atop components of the second-stage disk. The first-stage disk
failed in three pieces (Fig. 15). A fracture mechanics analysis of the first-stage disk was under-
taken at two locations on the disk: (1) crack at base of firtree and (2) crack at curvic bolt hole.
B_th areas are shown in Figure 16.
1. Stress Information
q'hc fracture mechanics analysis of the first-stage disk was performed using data derived
from engine test history. Four cases were examined:
a. Twenty-two tests prior to incident
b. Last test only (with no overspeed condition)
c. Overspeed condition
d. All 23 tests (with no overspeed condition).
The stresses used for the test history in cases a through d were obtained from an
axisymmetric ANSYS finite element model. For cases a, b, and d the stresses were obtained for
power levels of 65, 100, 104, and 109 percent, respectively. For case c, the stresses were obtaincd
for the power level corresponding to the overspeed condition (42,200 rpm). The stress contour
plots for the disk at power levels of 65 to 109 percent and at the overspeed condition are shown in
Figures 17 through 21 I13].
2. Material Properties
The first stage disk is made of Waspaloy. Operating conditions tor the disk were 550 °F,
4,400 psi in hydrogen gas. The disk was subjected to stresses for a time period exceeding 20
minutes. A literature search revealed crack growth rate data (da/dN-AK) for Waspaloy at room
temperature, 5,000 psi in hydrogen gas. The reference data were taken lor a typical SSME duty
cycle of t,_ minutes. Approximately 8.2 minutes of hold time at maximum load occurred in the test
data.
"I'o approximate the fatigue crack propagation properties of Waspaloy at 550 °F and 4,400
psi hydrogen, data taken at room temperature and 5,000 psi hydrogen were used (Fig. 22a). A
h_ld timc of approximately 49(1 seconds (8.2 minutes) was used to convert da/dN-AK data into da/
ttt-AK by considering the cyclic effect to be small. Crack growth with respect to time (da/dt) was
calculated by dividing the cyclic crack growth rate (da/dN) by the hold time (I cycle = 490
seconds). For hold times from 8 to 16 minutes, da/dt values were increased by a factor of 5, and
for hold times greater than 16 minutes, a factor of 10 was used. These factors are needed to
account for the increase in da/dt for larger hold times.
23
The estimated increases in da/dt are conjectural, i.e., there are no hold time data in
hydrogen to verify these estimates. However, da/dN data taken at 1,200 °F for hold times ranging
from 2 to 15 minutes indicate an increase in da/dN of close to a factor of 10 (Fig. 22b). If the
hydrogen effect with hold times behaves similarly, then the estimated increases in da/dt are plaus-
ible. At the current time, no better scheme for hold times greater than 8 minutes has been
developed II4].
Table I shows the time in seconds at each power level. For tests greater than 8 minutes,
higher growth rates were used for analysis, as previously described.
3. Solution Model
The NASCRAC was used in this investigation to perform life analyses and to calculate criti-
cal initial Haw sizes (CIFS). Two areas of interest were examined: (1) a through crack growing
radially inward from the base of the firtree, and (2) a part-through crack growing from a bolt hole
near the curvic coupling of the disk. The geometry models are shown in Figure 23. It should be
noted that the analyses were conducted on a per unit time basis (seconds) and not on aper cycle
basis. Therefore, when NASCRAC refers to a load cycle, it should be interpreted to mean I
second.
4. Results
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the failure investigation. The flaws in the curvic bolt
hole area are much smaller than the flaws at the firtree root. Therefore, the CIFS's calculated for
the curvic bolt area are the dominating flaws. Figure 24 contains a plot Of disk burst speed versus
critical flaw size. It can be seen from the figure that flaw size has a significant effect on burst
speed. The shaded portion of the figure is the area of yielding due to the stresses near the bolt
hole. The curve was estimated in this area with the end points determined by the burst speed
predicted when no flaw exists and the limits of linear elastic fracture mechanics.
24
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TABLE 1. ENGINE 0212 MATERIAL PROPERTIES DERIVATION
A) All 23 tests (8372 seconds)
Totals Power Levels Data Used
65% 100% 104% 109%
157 408 4105 1367
69 147 1247 581
9 55 166 61





















15 93 279 103
9 55 166 61
39 241 724 267





Time under 8 142 3 15 3826
minutes
8-16 minutes 54 54 968
Over 16 minutes 0 0 0

















TABLE 2. ENGINE 0212 STRESS SPECTRA













































TABLE 3. ENGINE 0212 CRITICAL FLAW SIZE RESULTS
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Section B
Figure 16. HPOTP disk sections analyzed.
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C. Hubble Space Telescope
The HST will allow scientists and engineers to see seven times farther than ever before.
The telescope consists of two mirrors - a primary and a secondary. The telescope weighs approxi-
mately 25,000 lb and is 43 ft long.
The fracture mechanics analysis results [15] of this section are from problems analyzed in
1982 and 1983. Portions of the following analyses have since been updated to account for new
load conditions, improved inspection criteria, etc. The fracture mechanics analysis was originally
done for a five launch, four landing scenario. Based on a memo from the chief engineer's office
[161, the fracture mechanics analysis was done for the scenario listed in Table 4, steps 1 through
12. This criteria was for three launches and two returns. The analysis highlighted in this section is
for steps I through 7 in Table 4, and was based on instructions per engineering management (two
launches and two returns).
The HST fracture mechanics analyses highlighted are for the following fracture sensitive
parts of the optical telescope assembly (OTA) main ring: inner and outer skins and fore and all
channel.
The main ring (Fig. 25) is an annular shell with rectangular cross sections. The main ring is
the main structural component of the OTA. All OTA loads are transmitted through the ring. Figure
26 shows a view of the ring as part of the primary mirror assembly. The rectangular section of the
ring consists of channels and skins (Fig. 27).
1. Stress Information
Table 5 shows the OTA loads spectra [17,18] and Table 6 shows the stresses used in the
fracture analysis based on Lockheed's stress analysis (liftoff combination No. 17).
2. Material Properties
Ti-6AI 4V
c = 5.7 x I()-I°
n = 3.18
Kic = 84.0 ksi-V_n
AK,h = 6.0 ksi-V_
_rys = 126.0 ksi
38
3. Solution Model
The FLAGRO4 computer code was used in the analysis. Two types of crack models were
analyzed:
I Part through center crack (Fig. 28)
2) Through center crack (Fig. 29)
Channel ,,ection - W = 9.0 in, t = 0.195 in
Skin section-W = 15.0 in, t = 0.25 in.
4. Results
The analysis results are shown m Figures 30 and 31 in the form of inspection criteria
curves. The curves were to be used as guidelines in the nondestructive evaluation of the ring.
N()rl't:_: After the safe-life analysis had been completed and inspection curves derived, it was deter-
nHncd by analysis that the ring skins and channels were fail-safe. A very thorough and complete
fail-safe analysis is contained in the appendix.
TABLE 4. OTA LOADING SCENARIO
TIlE FOLLOWINGSCENARIO IS BEING USED TO DEFINE TIlE
LIFETIME FOR TIIE OTA. TO MEET SERVIEE LIFE REQUIRE-
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Figure 28. HST NASA/FLAGRO center panel part-through crack geometry model.
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Figure 29. HST NASA/FLAGRO center panel through crack geometry model.
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Figure 31. HST inspection curve for inner and outer skins.
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D. Space Support Equipment (SSE) Scientific Instrument
Protective Enclosure (SIPE) Trunnion
The SSE consists of those hardware items mounted, stowed on, and transported by the
Space Transportation System (STS) to provide scheduled maintenance of the HST equipment and
scientific instruments. The SSE will provide environmental protection for orbital replaceable units
(ORU's) during prelaunch, launch, and orbit transfer. Once orbital altitude is attained, the SSE will
provide a maintenance platform to berth the HST in the cargo bay of the orbiter. This platform
will tilt and rotate the HST to aid in maintenance activities. The SSE will aid the crew in removal,
temporary storage, translation, installation, and activation activities associated with replacing failed
or degraded HST components (ORU's). It will also provide for storage for the failed component
during return to Earth in the orbiter [19].
1he trunnion, composed of Inconel 718 material (Figs. 32 and 33) [19], is designed to
support tbc SIPE to the load isolation system (LIS). Two trunnions are required for the flight
assembly, one each on the port and starboard sides. The trunnion is shaped as a hollow cone
approximately l I-in long and is fastened to the SIPE with eight bolts at the base and connected to
the LIS through a moonball at the apex. The trunnion is loaded transversely by translational forces
parallel to the orbiter X and Z coordinate axes [17].
1. Stress Information [20,21]
Maximum stress: Bending stress = 132,338 psi at 100 percent load at 6,598 Ib combined X
and Z load (CDR landing case 36). Maximum liftoff load = 58,881 lb X load (CDR liftoff case
105). Maximum stress = 118,097 psi. Load spectra cycles for load alleviation system:
Li ftoff: 9 cycles at 10(1% load
17 cycles at 75%
28 cycles at 50%
138 cycles at 25%
Landing: 16 cycles at 100%
25 cycles at 75%
30 cycles at 50%
47 cycles at 25%
Table 7 contains the entire spectrum as used in the analysis.
2. Material Properties
Inconel 718
K I_, = 90 ksi-V_m
c = 0.103 x 10 _
47
n = 2.63







The NASA/FLAGRO surface crack in a solid cylinder model in Figure 34 was used in the
analysis. The cylinder diameter was D = 0.7489 in. The initial surface flaw length was 0.100
(standard level eddy current).
4. Results
A 0.100-in flaw in the circumferential direction of 0.7489-in solid cyclinder Was analyzed.
Critical area was in a 0.12-in radius where 0.7489/0.7492-in diameter becomes 1,090-in diameter.
The analysis results proved conservative by using the smaller diameter. The NASA/FLAGRO
results indicated that this part survived the required 52 missions (13 x scatter of 4) for the above
flaw size. In addition, no unstable crack growth occurred until h_lfway through mission 60.
TABLE 7. SSE FATIGUE STRESS SPECTRUM


































































E. 270-Degree External Tank Attach Ring
The primary function of the external tank (ET) attach ring is to redistribute the strut loads
on the SRB case. Three struts connect the ET to the SRB at SRB station 1511.0. The attach ring
supports the integrated electronics assembly (IEA) box mounts and the wiring harness which con-
nects the IEA box to the system tunnel. The redesign utilizes the baseline 360 design hardware
between the 154 and 342 splices (Fig. 35, Structural Configuration). The new tapered sections
attach directly to these splice plates. Both the cap and web are spliced. The new part is an integral
cap and web design, in that it is machined out of one block of material. This eliminates the need




I,oads spectra data that specified the load level, number of cycles at each level, anti order
of occurrence of each event that the structural part experienced were developed from References
22, 23, and 24. Table 8 contains the spectrum loading data used in the analysis of the ring cap
segment. Table 9 gives an explanation of the spectrum steps given in Table 8 [23,24].
b. Material Properties
4340 Low Alloy Steel
K,_, = 90 ksi-V'mm
K_. = 90 ksi-V_m
AK, = 15.03 ksi-V_m




c = 0.791 x 10-s
n = 1.984





The NASA/FLAGRO part-through crack at a hole solution model (Fig. 37) was used to
analyze the portion of the ring cap segment shown in Figure 38.
W = !.75 in
t = 0.56 in
D = 0.685 in
Minimum edge distance = 0.41 in.
d. Results
Two types of flaws were analyzed: (1) a semicircular flaw and (2) a long shallow flaw.
(I) a = c = 0.05
(2) a = 0.01 and c = 0.05.
The flaw in (1) survived one mission (one mission with a scatter factor of four = 4 blocklives)
and the flaw in (2) survived 19 blocklives (4.75 missions).
Standard eddy-current NDE was recommended as the inspection technique for finding the
above flaws.
2. Web Segment
The web segment (Fig. 39) was analyzed for different crack configurations, but only the
embedded flaw will be highlighted here.
a. Stress Information
Loads spectra data that specified the load level, number of cycles at each level, and order
of occurrence of each event that the structural part experienced was developed from References 22,
23. and 24. Table 10 contains the spectrum loading data used in NASA/FLAGRO.
b. Material Properties
4130 low alloy steel
Kic = 80.0 ksi-X/_m
52
K_, = 80.0 ksi-V_n
_Ki = 9.86 ksi-V_n




c =-- 0.141 x 10 7
n -= 2.1"_8




The NASA/FLAGRO embedded flaw geometry (Fig. 40) was used in the analysis.
Width W = 7.23 in
Thickness t = 0.25 in .
d. Results
A flaw of depth 2a = 0.124 and crack length 2c = 0.25 survived through 40 missions {41)
x 4 = blocklives). Ultrasonic NDE was recommended as the inspection technique for finding this
flaw.
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EMPTY E.T. LOW CYCLE PRELAUNCH
EMPTY E.T. HIGH CYCLE PRELAUNCH
FULL E.T. LOW CYCLE PRELAUNCH








































































































TABLE 9. ET ATTACH RING STRESS SPECTRA BREAKDOWN. STEP BY STEP
A B C D E F
ZERO TO MAX SS.+OSC.LOAD (Pll ,P12,P13) PRB.AUNO-I CASES
P11 ,P12,P13 MAX.SS+OSC.LOAD TO P8,Pg,P10 MAXSS.-OSC.LOAD
P11 ,P12,P13 MAX SS.+OSC.LOAD TO P8,Pg,P10 MIN.SS-OSC.LOAD
P8,P9,P10 MIN.-OSC.LOAD TO P11 ,P12,P13 MIN SS.+OSC.LOAD
SAME EXPt,R4A'I'IGN AS STEP ONE ABOVE
SAME EXPLN_I"K_ AS STEP TWO ABOVE
7 c_M,E EKPLA_T1CN AS STEP THREE ABOVE
J
8 !SAME AS EXPLANATICN AS STEP R::XIR ABOVE


































=SAME EXPLANA_ AS STEP TWO ABOVE
SAME EXPLANATIC_ AS STEP THREE ABOVE
SAME ,z_SEXPLANATICN AS STEP FOUR ABOVE
SAME EXPLANA'nCN AS STEP ONE ABOVE
SAME EXPLANATION AS STEP TWO ABOVE
SAME EXPLANATION AS STEP THREE ABOVE
SAME AS EXPI.ANATION AS STEP FOUR ABOVE
P_ZERO BUILDUP TO PMAX.SS BUILDUP
PMAX SS. BUILDUP TO PMIN.SS BUILDUP
P_ZERO LIFTOFF TO PMAX.SS UFTOFF
PMAX.SS+ UFTOFF TO PMIN SS..LIFTOFF
P_ZERO MAX Q. TO PMAX SS. MAX Q.
PMAX.SS. MAX Q. TO PMIN.SS MAX Q.
PMAX.SS. MAX Q. TO PMIN.SS. MAX Q.
!PMAX.SS. MAX Q. TO PMIN.SS. MAX Q.
!PMAX.SS. MAX Q. TO PMIN.SS.MAXQ
PMAX .SS. MAX Q. TO PMIN.SS. MAX Q.
P_ZERO MAX G. TO PMAX ( MAXG. )
PMAX.MAX G. TO PMIN. MAX G.
,P_ZERO PRESTAGING TO PMAX. PREST_
'PMAX.PRESTAGING TO PMIN.PRESTAC_G





WATER IMPACT* * * * *
.... NO DATA READILY AVAILABLE" USED MAX. UFTOFF STRESS AS MAX. AND
iMIN.STRESS OF ALL CASES AS M_. ErRES$ IMPACT
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TABLE 10. ET ATTACH RING - WEB SEGMENT LOADING SPECTRUM
3TEP _ t _ MA _.
1:1 : 1: -B. 18: e.88
2: 1: 28: -B.35: -8.18
3: 1: 1: -B.26: -B.18
4: 1: 28: -8.e6: -8.84
5: 1: 1: -8.81: 8.88
G: 1: 2758888: -8.83: 8.88
7: 1: 1: -8.82: 8.88
8: 1: 2"/"58888: -8.82: 8.88
9: 1: 1: 8.88: 8.13
18: 1: 28: 8.11: 8.13
11: 1: 1: 8.13: 8.15
12: 1: 28: 8.15: 8.17
13: 1: 1: -8.81: 8.88
14: 1: 288808: -8.83: 8.88
1S: 1: 1: -8.82: 8.88
16: 1: 2BBBBB: -B.B2: 8.B8
17: 1: 1: -8.12: 8.88
18: 1: 2: -8.12: 8.12
19: 1: 1: 65.78: 66.88
28: 1: 14: 65.68: 66.88
21: 1: 1: 58.1B: 58.58
22: 1: 78: 58.18: 58.14:
23: 1: 175: 58.18: 58.14
24: 1: 1: 58.28: 58.58
25: 1: 78: 58.88: 58.28
26: 1: 175: 58.88: 58.28
27: 1: 1: 33.28: 34.88
28: 1: 1: 33.28: 34.18
29: 1: 1: 3.78: 4.88
30: 1: 1: 3.78: 3.98




(shore side) 342 ° Splice
Figure 35. ET 270-degree attach ring.
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Figure 37. ET NASA/FLAGRO part-through crack at a hole.
C
Figure 38. ET attach ring cap segment.
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Figure 40. ET NASA/FLAGRO embedded flaw geometry.
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F. B-1 Stand Lox Inner Tank
A leak before burst fracture mechanics analysis was performed on the B-1 stand LOX inner
tank at the National Space Test Laboratory (NSTL), now known as the Stennis Space Center
(SSC).
The LOX run tank was built in 1962 for Rocketdyne Santa Susanna Facility. The vessel
was transported via land/water from Santa Susanna to NSTL in early 1984. The vessel remained on
the barge during some modification work until installation on the B-I stand in 1987. Figure 41
shows the LOX tank configuration. The tank has a 45,000 gallon volume and is made of 304
stainless steel. The thickness of the tank varies between 0.483 to 0.982 in. It has a I 1.5-ft diame-
te_ and is 67.5 ft long. The tank had been ASME rated for 110 psig. A new operational condition
of 130 psig had been imposed at the time of the analysis.
1. Leak Before Burst Analysis
A part-through crack in a thin walled pressure vessel may grow by fatigue or stress corro-
sion until it reaches the outer wall, then the vessel will be leaking and there is a good chance that
detection follows. The possibility exists that fracture instability is initiated already by a surface
flaw. If this fracture is arrested as soon as the crack pops through the wall, the vessel starts leak-
ing and there is some time for crack detection before (through) cracks reach a critical crack size
again. A vessel behaving in this manner satisfies the leak before burst criteria [7].
a. Tank Wall
Figure 42 shows a schematic of the tank varying wall thickness and the corresponding hydro
head pressure, ullage vacuum head pressure, and stresses for each section of the tank.
h. Stress Information
It can be seen from Figure 42 that the minimum tank wall thickness section of 0.483 in has
the maximum applied stress of 21,303 psi, therefore one analysis on the wall is necessary because
this section is the thinnest and most highly stressed section. If this proved good then the other
sc,'tions would be satisfactory.
c. Material Properties
304 Stainless steel
Kj_. = 100 ksi-_/_n
AKth = 15 ksi-V_n
n = 2.89
c = 4.127 x 10 -4
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d. Solution Model
The NASA/FLAGRO center panel part-through crack model shown in Figure 43 was used
to evaluate the problem. It was also assumed that the cracks had propagated 90 percent through the
thickness which added more conservatism to the analysis. Two types of flaws were analyzed: long
shallow flaws (a/c = 0.1) and hemispherical flaws (a/c = 0.5). Table 11 contains the geometric
parameters.
2. Analysis Results
Table 11, cases A I and A2, show the analysis results for the tank wall analysis.
a. Cylinder
The cylindrical upper head section of 0.982 in is stressed to 20,681 psi. The maximum
stress of 21,303 psi was used on this section also, which made this part of the analysis conserva-
tive. Adding more conservatism, the cracks were assumed to have propagated 90 percent through
the thickness. The long shallow and hemispherical type flaws in a center crack part-through panel
were used in this analysis. The same material properties noted above were used.
Table I1, cases A3 and A4, show the analysis results from the cylinder analysis I25].
Figure 44 shows a graph of the critical through crack length versus stress levels (Fig. 42)
for each variable thickness section of the tank.
b. Welds
I) Fill penetration welds
2) Drain penetration welds.
Welds in the fill and drain penetrations of the LOX tank lower head were analyzed. Figure
45 shows a NASTRAN plot of the lower head [26].
c. Stress Information
A NASTRAN finite element model (Fig. 46) was used to obtain stresses in the fill and
drain penetrations. The maximum stress for the fill and drain penetrations was found to be 26,470
and 17,330 psi, respectively.
d. Material Properties
Based on information supplied at the time of the analysis, the same properties used in the




The NASA/FLAGRO part-through center crack geometry model was used in the analysis.
Note that the flaws were assumed to have propagated 90 percent through the thickness here also.
f. Results
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6 23.2 167.9 20,497
7 28.0 172.7 20,369
8 29.0 173.7 20,681
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Figure 42. B-! schematic of tank.
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Fracture Toughness: 100 ksi-sqrt(in)


















Figure 46. B-1 NASTRAN plot of LOX tank.
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VIII. SUMMARY
The fracture mechanics problems highlighted in this paper were from real-time analysis
problems. All of the analyses are conservative and in accordance with MSFC policy. Some of the
problems presented here have been updated to account for changes in design, environmental
effects, loads, stresses, etc. In analyzing the compendium of problems the analyst will obtain
knowledge in working a versus K solutions, leak before burst analysis, time dependent analyses,
life cycle analyses, and fail-safe analyses. The problems highlighted were analyzed using linear
elastic fracture mechanic concepts and tools and the FLAGRO4, NASA/FLAGRO, and NASCRAC
computer codes.
The fracture mechanics analyst problem solving scenario may involve interfacing with the
stress analyst, materials engineer, and NDE engineer and the designer. Figure 47 which diagrams
the fracture control sequence shows the interface between the different engineering operations and
disciplines 1271. Once the fracture mechanics analysis (Fig. 48) has been completed, the results
need to be documented in a complete fracture control report detailing all pertinent analyses and
inspection results. A sample fracture mechanics reporting sheet, to be included in a fracture control
report, is shown in Figure 49.
Along with the fail-sale analysis of the HST main ring, the Appendix section contains a
safe life analysis of the SRB aft skirt. The SRB aft skirt analysis addresses the 1.375-in thick forg-
ing to skin welds and was performed according to MSFC-HDBK-1453, "Fracture Control Program
Requirements," and USBI-10PLN-O023, "Solid Rocket Booster Fracture Control Plan." A basic
requirement for the aft skirt is that detected flaws survive 40 flight uses times a service life factor
of 4. Thus, a detected flaw must survive at least 160 flight uses as demonstrated by testing or
analysis. Linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) was performed using the NASA/FLAGRO
computer program. The fracture mechanics analysis is detailed in the appendix section.
You may have noted in some of the analyses (post-1985) that the material constant, Bk, has
been set equal to zero to ensure that a lower bound plane strain fracture toughness is used and
adds to the conservatism of the analysis.
Fracture mechanics and fracture control are an integral part of providing safe space flight
structures. The structural/fracture mechanics sector at MSFC is strongly committed to providing
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SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER (SRB) AFT SKIRT
The following analysis was done by United Space Boosters
Incorporated analyst.
The Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) are used for approximately 123
seconds to supplement the orbiter thrust during the launch and
ascent phases of flight. Prior to and including launch, the entire
Space Transportation System (STS) is supported by two SRB aft skirts
attached to the Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) by four holddown
posts on each aft skirt.
During shuttle transportation on the crawler and Space Shuttle Main
Engine (SSME) thrust buildup, a hold-down system is required in the
SRB aft skirt to resist prelaunch and launch holddown loads at the
MLP. Thrust buildup loads are critical for the aft skirt during the
manned night phase.
After burnout, the SRB's are jettisoned and moved away from the
shuttle by booster separation motors located in the aft skirt and
frustrum. SRB descent is braked by parachutes. The frustum is
separated from the SRB and descends on a drogue chute while the
SRB descends on the main parachutes. Water impact and cavity
collapse loads are critical for unmanned loading of the aft skirt. After
splashdown in the ocean, the frustum and SRB are recovered and
refurbished for reuse.
STRUCTURAL DESCRIPTION
The SRB aft skirt is a stiffened conical shell fabricated from 2219-
T852 aluminum plate and forging alloy. Figure G.1 shows a cut-away
view of the aft skirt. The diameters of the base and forward end of
the aft skirt are approximately 207 and 146 inches, respectively. The
conical shell angle is 18.67 ° from the vertical. The height of the aft
skirt is 86.5 inches. An aluminum ring forging is welded
circumferentially to a 1.375-inch thick skin at the forward end of the
conical shell. The four hold-down post forgings are welded
longitudinally along the cone axis to a 1.375-inch thick aluminum
skin.
STRESS HISTORY/LOAD SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT
The load spectrum used in this report was developed using a 180
degree symmetric NASTRAN model of the SRB aft skirt. Loads were
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developed for conditions prior to and including launch. These loads
were then used in a static analysis to determine the state of stress in
aft skirt welds. All stresses are calculated at limit load, i.e., 100%
load level for fracture analysis.
The load spectrum is given in Table G.1. Loads considered significant
for crack growth include wind loads experienced on the launch pad,
SSME thrust buildup for a flight readiness firing (FRF), rebound from
FRF and SSME thrust buildup for launch. This particular spectrum
reflects the sequence of events for STS-26 return to flight.
A more detailed load spectrum was developed specifically for flaws
on "tension posts". Tension posts are holddown posts which carry the
large tensile loads during SSME thrust buildup. Because the aft skirt
is cone shaped, this tensile load produces a compressive stress across
the longitudinal weld. However, during an FRF or on-pad abort, these
stresses are reversed and a lower level of tensile stresses is
produced. An example of this spectrum is given in the following
analyses.
INSPECTIONS
Prior to the Challenger accident, aft skirt welds were inspected only
once by x-ray following fabrication. No other inspections were
performed between flights. In an effort to improve flight safety,
reburbishment inspections were implemented prior to aft skirt
reuse. Critical weld areas were identified and ultrasonic inspection
now takes place after fabrication and after each flight. Because of
these inspections, critical weld areas have a single flight use
minimum requirement and are evaluated prior to each fight.
ANALYSIS
The holddown post forging-to-skin longitudinal weld is shown in
Figure G.2. There are two weld seams per post, for a total of eight
weld seams per aft skirt. The forward ring-to-skin circumferential
weld is shown in Figure G.3 The aft skirt welds have been analyzed
using detailed NASTRAN finite element models and strain gage data
from a structural qualification test of the aft skirt. The aft skirt
longitudinal weld failed under structural test conditions at
approximately 128% of prelaunch loads. Because of this, strain gages
were mounted on flight skirt welds to monitor strains during liftoff.
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Fracture analysis of the weld seams falls into one of three categories.
1) Worst case finite element stresses are used to evaluate flaws in
low stress areas. 2) Strain gage data is used in highly stressed areas
and for large flaws which must be evaluated using actual test data.
3) The longitudinal weld experiences strains at or above yield at
limit load in some local areas. When flaws are detected in these
areas, flawed specimen tests must be performed to demonstrate
adequate safe life. An example of each type of analysis follows.
1) WELD SEAM ANALYSIS - LOW STRESS REGIONS
The low stress area is analyzed by selecting worst case stresses from
NASTRAN model data and calculating crack growth to failure. Linear
elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) is applicable. Detected flaws in
this area can then be plotted on the crack growth curve and its
remaining safe life determined. Because this region is not highly
stressed, inspections are performed only once. Therefore, safe life
for this region must be at least 160 mission uses. An example of this
analysis is given in section 1 using the following procedure:
a) Refer to inspection data sheet for location and size of flaw. The
sample inspection sheet shows flaws on a longitudinal weld only.
b) Crack growth is plotted using worst case stresses from the finite
element model.
c) Safe life for each detected flaw is determined according to flaw
size on the crack growth plot.
2) WELD SEAM ANALYSIS - STRAIN GAGE DATA
Flaws are assessed individually with strain gage data when they
cannot be shown good using conservative model stresses or are
located in a high stress gradient area. Finite elements may not
correctly reflect the actual stress distribution where large stress
gradients exist. These areas are considered critical and are therefore
inspected before each use. Safe life requirements are assessed on a
flight-by-flight basis. An example of this analysis is given in section
2 using the following procedure:
a) Refer to inspection data sheet for location and size of flaw. The
sample inspection sheet shows flaws on a longitudinal weld only.
b) Follow procedure for locating proper strain gage corresponding to
the desired flaw location. This is necessary because test data
corresponds to a left hand skirt. Therefore flaws on right hand skirts
must be correlated by symmetry to a left hand skirt location. The
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enclosed procedure also mentions the use of strain gage data for
flaws in the circumferential weld.
c) Calculate safe life using appropriate strain gage values.
LONGITUDINAL WELD - TEST RESULTS
3) In a few limited areas, stresses exceed yield for the weld heat
affected zone. Flaws in these areas can only be assessed by
performing precracked specimen tests. Results from these tests are
given in Tables G.2 and G.3. Test specimens were prepared from
plate-to-plate 2219 aluminum alloy welds (t=1.375) using the same
weld schedule as is used in the fabrication of the aft skirt. Two inch
wide dogbone type specimens shown in figure G.4 were cut from the
welded plates. Surface flaws were introduced and the specimens
were then cycled at low stress to initiate fatigue crack growth. A
cyclic axial stress spectrum from 0 to limit stress was then applied
for 160 cycles. This represents 40 flights with a service life factor of
4 with one application of load per flight. This does not include FRF.
If failure did not occur proir to 160 cycles, the specimens were then
pulled to failure to determine residual strength. Two specimens
were tested in bending. One survived the cyclic stress and the other
was accidentally overloaded. No residual strength is reported for the
bending specimens.
The first series of tests were intended to demonstrate adequate safe
life for the maximum undetectable flaw size. An initial surface crack
goal was 0.080 inches deep, 0.160 inches long. Specimens were
cycled to a stress of 38 ksi, estimated as the worst case weld stress at
100% prelaunch loads. Results are given in Table G.2 and are
considered successful since all specimens survived a goal of 160
cycles.
Another series of tests were performed to demonstrate adequate
safe life for a detected flaw on aft skirt S/N 20032. The precrack
size goal was 0.130 inches deep, 0.260 inches long. Specimens were
cycled to a stress of 38 ksi as in the previous test series. This is
conservative since the actual stress at this location is estimated at
28.9 ksi. Test results are given in Table G.3. Results are listed in
order of increasing initial crack size. The largest precrack survived
only 5 cycles, but is significantly larger than the desired precrack
size.
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At the time this paper went to print, another series of tests were
planned to assess a flaw on aft skirt S/N 20023. The detected flaw is
located on a tension post and experiences a compressive stress above
yield during prelaunch. If an on-pad abort or FRF occurs, cyclic
tensile stresses follow the compression cycle. These tests will
observe the effect of a compression overload on fatigue crack growth.
ASTM test procedure E647 will be followed to measure da/dN versus
delta-K with a periodic compression overload cycle. Compact tension
test specimens will be cut from forging to plate weldments. Previous
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AL ALLOY 2219-T87 WELDMENT
ULTRASONIC (A) assumed
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BENDING/AXIAL COMPCNENTS
I0_')% NORMAL-X STRESS
COMPONENT: UP'PER LONGITUDINAL WELD
















1 I -3. c'_'_ -L 0. _')2 -S. 51
12 -0.84 -5.38 -3. 11
L7 -i. 98 -10. 1_'J -6.04
18 -0. 49 -6.95 -3.7_.
:='5 7.47 7. _,_'::' 7. 40
:='6 1. cl6 -3.41 -I. 18
7,5 -4.45 -13.61 -9.03
36 7.40 7.53 7. 47
_7 .._" 76 -0. c')4 1 • 86
=8 -4. 75 -I_.-"86 -9.31
,37 7.47 7.3_ 7. 40
















_a = S,=, + Si
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FATIGUE CRAC_ GROWTH ANALYSTS
(¢_qplJtC,<l: WASA/FLAGRO, 1986 Aug version, 1987 Jut rev.)
U.S. customary units Cinches, ksi, ksi sqrt(in)]
PROBLEM TITLE
AFT SK[RT UPPER LONGITUDINAL _LD FRACTURE ANALYSIS
GECI_ETRY
;_ODEL: TCO1-Thro_h ¢rsck in center of prate.
Prate Thickness, t • 1.]720
" _/idth, _1 • 5.0000
FLAW SXZE:
m (tnit.) • 0.7_00
NATL I: Z219-T87 AL, _IELDNENTS lEE-O]
Mmteriit PrOperties:
:Natt: YS : Kle : K1¢ : Ak : 9k : Thk : [c : _]scc:
: No.: : : : : : : : :
: 1 : 32.0: :30.0: 20.0: 0.7_: 0.00: 1.372: 20.0:
:_atL: Crock Growth Eqn Cormt_ts (cLosure) :
: mo.: C : n : p : q : OKo : Co : d : D[1 :ALI_o:S_x/:
: : : : : : : : : : :SIGo :
: .... : ......... : ..... : .... : .... : ...... : .... ! .... : ...... : ..... : ..... :
: 1:0.3_B0-06:1,8S8:1.00:I.00: 2.50:1.00:1.00: 5.90: 1._: 0.30:
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AFT SKIRT UPPER LOIGZTUOINAL qn_LD FRACTURE ANALYSIS
I,K_EL: TC01
FATIGUE SPECTRUM STRESS TABLE
............... ....o.o...oo..
NO_qAL-X G_IDPOINT STRESS G,O:82357/82351 P:6 SE:ZO
S : N: NUNgER : SO : S1 :
T : A: OF : : :
E : T: FATIGUE : (kaY) : (ksi) :
P : L: CYCLES : tl : t2 : tl : t2 :
I: 1: 1155.0000 : -3.11: -6.51: -2.27: -3.51:
2: 1: _o00_) : -3.72: -6.04: -3.23: -4.06:
3: 1: 4.0000 : -1.18: 7.40: -2.24: -0.07:
4: 1: 1.0000 : ?.47: -9.03: 0.06: -4..58:
5: I: 40.0000 : -9.31: 1.86: -4.56: -1.90:
6: 1: 1.0000 : -3.45: 7.40: -2._: -0.07:
Errvfrormmta( Crack Gr_th C_ack for _umtafnid Strm
(ICmx less than K1acc): ROT SET
.....o.
AFT SKIRT UPPER L31GITUOINAL WELD FRACTURE ANALYSTS
Iq])EL; TCOl
FATIGUE SPECTRUM INPUT TABLE
N_MAL-X GRIDPOINT STRESS C_:B2357/82351 P:6 SE:20
[Note= Stress • lrq:_ Value _' Str_s Fic_or]
Streaa FKtora SFO, SFI: 1.00 1.00
S : M: NUMBER : SO : 51 :
T : A: OF : : :
E : T: FATIGUE : : :
P : L: CYCLES : ,tl : t2 : tl : t2 :
ooo:oo:oo°
1: 1: 1155.0000 : -3.11: -6.51: -2.27: -3.51:
2: 1: 993.0000 : -3.72: -6.04: -3.23: -4.06:
3: 1: 4.0000 : -1.18: ?.40: -2.24: -0.07:
4: 1: 1.0000 : 7.47: -9.03: 0.06: -4.58:
S: 1: 40.0000 : -9.31: 1.86: -4.56: -1.90:
6: I: 1.0000 : -3.45: 7.40: -2.84: -0.07:
Er_trormmtat Crack Growth C_eck for Suetained Stresses
(Ira_x tess than Klscc): NOT SET
°.°°°°°
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AFT SKIRT UPPER LONGITUOf_At. NIELD FRACTURE AMALYS[S
NOD(L: TC01
/I
A.A,,ZS. LTS: = O.q 
.... .... ....... o.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY




30 O. 7607'_LIQ 12.304908
40 0. 7644_ 12.34220O
S0 0. 768227 12,380037
60 0.77"2030 12._1_36
70 0.77'5890 12.457415
80 0.77'9_I06 12. _,969_
90 O. 7'8_7'_ 12.537188
I00 O. 7_7120 12.STa021
110 0.RI_I 12.61_14
120 0. 7960a;' 12.66168,8
130 O. 800321 12. Y04569
140 0,8O4624 12,71.8180
150 0.8O8998 12. _ZS49
160 0.8134¢8 12. &177'03
170 0.817974 12._6T'Z
180 O. _.2S80 12.930_7
19( _ O. _?,7266 12.97'8182.
200 O. &32043 13.0267'91
210 0. ¢.X6906 13.076.153




260 0. _QJ&B6 13.339g_.
270 o.s6a16_ _3._961S8
2_0 0. ar_761 13.453671
29O o, a79_1 13.S1254S
300 0.&_5_2 13. ST2/_ 1
310 0.891319 13._
320 O. 897,Q,69 13.69_06S
330 _._ 13.;_3_4S
340 o.9_o16a 13._9999
350 0.916_4 13. _J_!,733
360 0,923557 13.969463
370 0,930528 14.042317




420 O. _ 14.4.43922
430 O. 9T7018 14.533073
0._ 14._740
450 0.996705 14. 722233
I.004062 14.82.2910
480 I. 02,3967 15,03_532
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AFT SI(ZRT UPPER CO_¢GJT'J31NAL'.,(LD FRACTUREANALYSTS
PCOEL: TC01
IL_C_ FINAL FLAWSIZE _ )tAX




520 I. 069_?.7 15.543631
530 I •0_-_9"a6 15.690331
5,60 _. 096896 15. _7"T74
550 1.111847 16.017'8d6
560 1.127975 16.203110






630 I. 32B90S 18.704,331
FINAL RESULTS:
UrBtab(e crack |r_th, nix strm fntlnJ|ty exc_ cr_t|caL value:
r mint • 29.07 [ cr * 20.00
_T CYCLE NO. 4. OF LOAD STEP llO. 3 OF ILOCX NO. 638
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CRACK MODEL : TCOI - Through Crack in finite width plate is assumed.
For a given initial crack length (larger than minimum
specified in MSFC- 5TD-1249) along the circumference
of the weldment, the analysis is to determine the final
critical crack length and the number of flights at which
the flaw reaches the critical size.
Thickness = 1.451 in.
Width = 5.0 in.
a = 0.2 in. (this specifies initial crack length of
0.4 inches.)
(MSFC-STD -1249 specifies minimum detectable length of











STRESS SPECTRUM: Area which has maximum tension stress (identified
from Ref. [i], Aft Skirt Recertification Report) is
considered to be the fracture critical location.
Grid point stresses at 42801, 42803 (8_-22.375",
real side) are used for this analysis.
Load Case _42801 _42803 SO S1
FMII -18.54 -7.19 -12.87 -5.68
FMI2 -9.98 -3.56 -6.77 -3.21
FMI7 -18 .71 -6.90 -12 .81 -5 .90
FMI8 -12 .80 -4 .38 -8 .59 -4 .21
FM25 13.99 7.17 10.58 3.41
FM26 -6.52 -1.63 -4.06 -2.45
FM27 0.32 0.83 0.58 -0.26
FM28 -25.81 -9.91 -17.86 -7.95
FM35 -25.31 -9.83 -17.57 -7.74
FM36 14.36 7.29 10.83 3.54
FM37 13.99 7.17 10.58 3.41
FM38 -11.56 -3.95 -7.76 -3.81
unit in ksi.






The result shows that for given initial flaw of 0.4 inches, the Aft
Skirt Forward Ring/Skin Interface Weldment is capable of sustaining 727
cycles before reaching the critical flaw length of 1.45 inches. Figure
12.5.2 plots the fracture growth versus number of flights. The NASA/FLAGRO
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Figure 12.5.2 Crack Growth Curve for Skin to Forward Ring Weld
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FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH ANALYSIS
o°mo°.o ......... . ............
(coml:_ted: IIASA/FLAGRO, 1986 Ac_l versicr_j 1987 Jut rev.)
U.S. custoRwry units Cinches, ksi, ksi sqrt(in)]
PROBLEN TITLE
AFT SKZRT FOR_RG R|NG/S_IN INTERFACE _ELD
GEONETRY
I(30EL: TOOl-Through crlcJc in cuntmr of pirate.
Prate Thic_l, t • 1J.510
" Width, _ • 5.0000
FLAW SIZE:
• (Init.) • 0.2000
MATERIAL
XATL 1:2219-T87 AL, WELDMEMTS
Neteriet Propert|eql:
:Natt: ¥$ : Kle : Ilc : Ak : Ik : Thk : _¢ : [Ixc¢:
: NO.: : : : : : : : :
: .... : ...... : ...... : ...... : ..... : ..... : ....... : ...... : ...... :
: 1 : 32.0: 30.0: 20.0: 0.75: 0.00: 1.451: 20.0:
:Matt: Crick Grouth ECln Corttantx (¢toeure) :
: No.: C : n : p : q : OKo : Co : d : DK1 :AIpha:SIm@:
: : : : : : : : : : :SlGo :
: .... : ......... : ..... : .... : .... : ...... : .... : .... : ...... : ..... : ..... :
: 1:0.3¢8D-06:1.858:1.00:1.00: 2.50:1.00:1.00: S._): 1._J: 0.30:
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AFT SglRT FORI.[ARG RING/SlIM INTERFACE _ELD
_O£L: TC01
FATIGUE SPECTRUM STRESS TABLE
................... ° .........
$ : M: WJNIIER : SO : Sl :
T : A: OF : : :
E : T: FATIGUE : (ks|) : (ksi) :
P : L: CYCLES : _1 : t2 : tl : t2 :
---:-.: .............. : ....... : ....... : ....... : ....... :
1: I: 1155.0000 : -12.87: -6.77: -5.M: -3.21:
2: 1: 903.0000 : -12.81: -8.59: -5.90: -4.21:
3: 1: 4.0000 : -4.06: 10.58: -2.45: 3.&1:
4: I: 1._00 : -17.57: 10.83: -7.74: 3._:
S: I: /,O.O(X)O : -17.86: 0.58: -7.9'J: -0.26:
6: 1: 1.0000 : -7.76: 10.58: -3.81: 3.k1:
Snv_romentat Crack Grovth Check for _Jl_i|rld Strtll#
(_ux tess thin [Iscc). MOT SET
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AFT SKIRT FORWARG RJNG/';_|N INTERFACE _IELD
MOOEL: TC01
ANALYSIS IESULTS:
...... . ...... o.o.
ORIOfN_t. P_.G_ '-.
OF POOR Q4JAL{TY

















320 O o269296 11.672_
340 0.27"J 54)..3 1t. 810_x32
360 0.2_.m1_4 11.954563



















Uruitalb(e crick grouth, mRx stress Interullty exceeds crftlcet vott,_:
mx • 20.02 _ cr • 20.00
AT CYCLE NO, 2. OF LOAD STEP NO. 4 OF {LCX:X NO. 728
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7-_ Iol ....... T'6IoZ. ..... o,'z._ " . T_.to3
keSqlq-_, ;_sq-_s e, 7. t ....... Y 6_
T 6099 -.- a, q--_ 7"6 too
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_¢_: _ASA/FL_GRO, 19_ AL_cJversion, t98;" Jut rev.)
U.S. cL;-._omary _ni_s (fnche_, ksi, ksJ s<;r_C(n)]
P_OELEM TITLE •
......... °.°.
AFT $1([RT VERTIC._L WELD ANC]NL¥: PR PV&O2qI_
GEC:ICETRY
_K3DEL: ECOI-E_CN_ctc_'_:[ crack in pta_m (:_)
FLAW SIZ[:
a ((nit.) - 0.2000
c (inic.) • 0.2000
ale (init.) I 1.000
WATL I: 2219-T852 AL, F_GING [8[_0_
Material Prc_::,erties:
:MaCl: YS : (la : (1¢ : Ak : |k : Thk : (¢ : [Iscc:
: Wo.: : : : : : : : :
: .... : ...... : ...... : ...... : ..... : ..... : ....... : ...... : ...... :
: 1 : 3O.S: 22.0: 22.0: 0.75: O.OO: 1.3_: 22.0:
:Matt: Crick _rovth [qn Ccw'_stants (cLosure) :
: wo.: C : n : p : q : 0[o : ¢o : d : 0[1 :At;:t_a:Sam.x/:
: : : : : : : : : : :SIGo :
: .... : ......... : ..... : .... : .... : ...... : .... : .... : ...... : ..... : ..... :
: 1:0.15_-06:2.72_h0.50:0.50: 2.50:1._:1.00: 6._: 1._: 0.30:
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AFT SKIrt VERTICAL ',/ELO _NONLY: PR ;_V'-OZ5190
_OEL : EE01
FAT%C_JE SPECT_'N '_PUT T,ImLE
CHore: Stress • :nf_Jt VaLue • Stre_js FIctor]
Stress Ft¢'or 5FO: Z9.5
$ : H: NI._BER : SO :
T : A: OF : :
E : I': FAT[G_JE :
P : L: CYCLS$ : tl : t2 :
-..:-.: .............. : ....... : ....... :
I: I: 1.0000 : -1.00: 1.00:
Z: I: 1.0000 : -0.95: 0.95:
3: I: 1.0000 : -0.90: 0.90:
_: I: 1.0000 : -0._: 0._:
5: I: 1.0000 : -0.82: 0.82.:
6: I: 1.0000 : -0.78: 0.73:
7: 1: '.0000 : -0.74: 0.74:
8: I: 1.0000 : *0.71: 0.71:
9: I: 1.0000 : -0.67: 0.67:
I0: I: 1.0000 : -0.6_,: 0._:
11: I: 1.0000 : -0.61: 0.61:
12: I: 1.0000 : -0.58: 0.58:
13: I: 1.0000 : -0.55: 0.55:
l&: I: 1.0000 : "0.52: 0.52:
15: I: 1.0000 : -0.50: 0.50:
16: 1: 1.0000 : -0.47: 0._7:
17: t: 1.0000 : -0.45: 0._5:
18: I: '.0000 : -0._3: 0.43:
19: 1: ".0000 : -0._I: 0.41:
20: 1: !.0000 : -0.39: 0._9:
21: 1: 1.0000 : -0.37: 0.37:
22: 1: 1.0000 : -0.]5: 0.35:
?.3: 1: 1.0000 : -0.3_: 0.33:
24: 1: 1.0000 : -0.32: 0.32:
ZS: I: 1.0000 : -0.30: 0.30:
Env_ronn_ntal Crack Grovth Check




AFT SI_%RT VE,;ffIC.._L '.ELD ANC_LY: PR PV40ZS190
,"_OEL: EC01
,¢AT_GUE SPECT,qL'N STRESS TASIE
...o.°°ooo. ........... . ......
/¢_X;PI._ STRESS S_ECT_LI_
S : _: NI_BE_ : SO :
Y : A: OF _ :
: T: FATtC,,J_ : (ksi) :
P : L: CYCLES : 11 : 12 :
...:oo:..o ....
I: I: 1,0000 : -29.50: 29.50:
2: I: 1.0000 : "28,02: 28.02:
3: I: 1.0000 : -26.55: 26.aS:
4: 1: 1.0000 : -Z5,37: 25.37:
5: I: 1.0000 : -24,19: 24.19:
6: I: 1.0000 : -_,01: _I.01:
7: I: 1,0000 : -21._: 21._:
8: I: 1.0000 : -20._: 20._:
9: 1: 1.0000 : -19.77': 19.T/':
I0: I: 1.0000 : -IL_: 18._:
11: I: 1.0000 : -la.O0: la.O0:
12: I: 1,0000 : -17.11: 17.11:
13: I: 1.00_ : -16.9: 16._I:
14: 1: 1.00_ : -15._: 15._:
15: I: 1.00_ : -14.7q5: 1&._:
16: I: 1.0000 : -13._: 13._:
17: 1: 1.0000 : -13.27: 13.27:
18: I: 1.0000 : -_2.69: 12.69:
19: I: 1.0000 : -12.10: 12.10:
20: I: 1.0000 : -11.50: 11.50:
21: I: 1.0000 : -10.92: !0.9Z:
22: 1: 1.0000 : -10.32: 10.32:
23: I: 1.0000 : -9.74: 9.74:
24: 1: 1.0000 : -9._,_: 9.4.4:
25: 1: 1.0000 : -8.85: 8.85:
Erntironmln_al Crack _ro_th C_ec_ for Sustlir, ed Str,les
(Iamx teal tha_ KIsc¢): NOT SET
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I 3.2e3_7 3.20302Z 15.0180&I I&.98_
Z 0.2_193 0.2_140 15.135390 15.10_51
3 0209_ 0.2_361 15.255821 15.Z2.?.582
4 0.212802 0.212_9 15.37_P&_ 15._11
5 0.21627_S 0.2161_1 15.5_592 15._300
6 0.2198;"/' 0.219694 "5_02 15.5W27_
7 _.22._6_7 0.22._]82= 15.771837 15.7"31776
8 G.227_7"/' 0.22_11 15.910&_8 15.&6816_?,
9 0.711&_ 0._'_1181 16.053_28 16.0(J,_1614
I_ O._.,,=Q,S&7 0.26.4_ 16.51_58 16.G571_1
13 0._9_ 0._6_B715 16._7414_ 16.6165&,_,
15 0.25937"_' 0.25_652 17.0194,_ 16._
16 0,_6&796 0.Z6._969 17.20_09 17o130T3_
17 0.271_z,85 0.269_46 17.393369 17.315671
18 0.276476 O.ZT"3&07 17.592770 17.5083_
19 0.2_2,799 0.281580 17.801590 17.709667
20 0.289490 0.28_9 18.0_0_66 17.920_1
F%NAL RESULTS:
3roKe ¢_ro_j_, 1-d stress inte_i¢y exceeds crftfcal VlLU_e:
K _U (TC01) • 28.17 R ¢r • 22.00
AT CYCLE NO. I, OF LOAD STEP NO. I OF _LOCI_ NO. 21
C2AC_ SIZE A • 0.Z_9490 , AIC • 1.00483
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FATIGUE CRAC_ GRC'alTH AMALY$1S
.°°o ........... o .... o .... .°o.
(cCCrlpute_:l:4ASA/FLAGRO, 19_ AI._jversion, 1987 JuL rev.)
U.$. ¢_stoctlmrnf _zli:s [tncMes, htsi, ksi sclrt(irt)]
_QOELEN TTTLE
..°. .... .o°.°
AFT SKZR.T VERTICAL _LO ANCI4ALT - PR-PVG'O_190
_ECIqETRY
°o°oo°°°
_::IDEL: $C01-Surfi,:e crac,v, in finite width plate (Z]:)
PLate Thickness, t = 1.37qJ0
" Width, W = 7.SO00
FLAW SIZE:
am (_nit.) • 0,2000
C (_nit.) • 0.2000
ilc (init.) • 1.000
_(ATL I: 2219-T8_2 AL, F_GIliG (21K=O]
Nateriml Proaerttes:
:Mitt: _r$ : K1e : KIc : Ak : 8k : Thk : ICe : (Zs¢=:
: _1o.: : : : -: : : : :
: ----: ...... . ...... : ...... • ..... : ..... : ....... : ...... : ...... :
: I : 30.5: 22.0: 22.0: 0._: O.OO: 1,37'J: 22.0:
:_8:L: C,-ict Growth Sqn Cons:ants (cLosure) :
: Mo.: C : n : l: : q : OKo : Co : d : OK1 :Atl_i:$mmx/:
: : : : : : : : : : :S|G4 :
: .... : ......... : .... ..- .... :..o.:.°-..o : .... : .... : ...... : ..... : ..... :
: I :0.15_-06:2.7"_:0.50:0._0: 2._0:1.00:1.00: 6.23: 1.7_: 0.30:
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AFT $[_RT VERTICAL _./EL0 ANCla.AL_- _R-PV&02_'9",',2
VK_OEL:SC01
FAT[CUE $PECT_,qq [NI_JT T_BLE
...... °..oo ............. ..°o
MAXEHt.iMS_SSS SPECTRUM
CHore: Stress • TrOat Val_ " Stress Fector!
Stress Factors SFO, SFI: Z9.5 O.O00E*O0
S : _: _IJ_4KER : SO : Sl :
T : A: OF : : :
E : T: FATIGUE : : :
P : L: C_C_ES : tl : t2 : tl : t2 :
...... : .............. : ....... : ....... : ....... : ....... :
I: I: 1.0000 : -1.00: 1.00: 0.3;: 0.00:
2: 1: 1.0000 : -0.9_: 0.75: 0.00: 0.00:
3: t: 1.0000 : -0.90: 0.90: 0.O0: 0.00:
_: I: 1.0000 : -0.86: 0.,,._6: 0.C0: 0.00:
5: 1: 1.0000 : -0._2.: 0.Z_2.: 0.00: 0.00:
6: 1: 1.0000 : -0.73: 0.78: 0.00: 0.00:
7: 1: 1.0000 : -0.7_: 0.7&: 0.00: 0.00:
8: 1: 1.0000 : -0.71: 0.71: 0.00: 0.00:
9: 1: 1.0000 : -0.67: 0.67: 0.00: 0.00:
10: 1: 1.0000 : -0.6,;: 0._d.: 0.00: 0.00:
11: 1: 1.0000 : -0.61: 0.61: 0.00: 0.00:
12: 1: 1.0000 : -0.58: 0.58: 0.00: 0.00:
13: 1: 1.0000 : -0.55: 0.55: 0.00: 0.00:
1_: 1: 1.0000 : -0.52: 0.52: 0.00: 0.00:
15: 1: 1.0000 : -0.50: 0.50: 0.00: 0.00:
16: 1: 1.0000 : -0._7: 0._7: 0.33: 0.00:
17: I: 1.0000 : -0._5: 0._5: 0.33: 0.00:
la: 1: 1.0000 : -O.A3: 0._3: 0.00: 0.00:
19: 1: 1.0000 : -0._1: 0._1: 0.33: 0.00:
ZO: 1: 1.0000 : -0.39: 0.39: O.O0: 0.00:
Z1: 1: 1.0000 : -0.37: 0.37: 0.OO: 0.00:
Z2: I: 1.0000 : -0.35: 0.35: 0.00: 0.00:
Z3: 1: 1.0000 : -0.33: 0.33: 0.00: 0.00:
24: 1: 1.0000 : -0.32: 0.32: 0,00: 0.00:
25: 1: 1.0000 : -0.30: 0.30: 0.00: 0.00:
E._v_rormmtal Cru¢_ Grouth Cl_eck for $_tairm:l Stresses
(_x Less _an KIsc¢): NOT S_T
...o..e
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AFT SKIRT VERT[CAL '_ELO ANOI4AL_ - PR-;V&025190
"OOEL : SC01
FA1,IOJE SPECTRL;N STRESS TAGLE
.=°o=°.=°ooo....=.o ..........
MAXIMt.Aq S11.RESS $PE'TR_q
S : )4: MLI49ER : SO : S1 :
1" : A: OF : : . :
E : T: FATIGUE : (ksi) : (ksi) :
P : L: CYCLES : t,1 : t2 : tl : tZ :
...:..: ........... _..: ....... : ....... : ....... : ....... :
1: 1: I.G000 , -29.50: L_.50: 0.00: 0.00:
Z: I: 1.0000 : -Z8.02: 28.02: 0.00: 0.00:
3: I: 1.0000 : -26.55: Z6.55: 0.00: 0.00:
_,: 1: 1.0000 : -25.37: 25.37: 0.00: 0.00:
5: 1: 1.0000 : -24.19: Z4.19: 0.00: 0.00=
6: I: 1.0000 : -_'_.01: _.01: 0.00: 0.00:
7: 1: 1.0000 : -21.a3: ZI.83: 0.00: 0.00:
8: 1: 1.0000 : -20,95: 20.95: 0.00: 0.00-
9: I: 1.0000 : -19.77: 19.T;P: 0.00: 0.00:
10" 1: 1.0000 : -18.&15: 18.88: 0.00: 0.00:
11: I: 1.0000 : -18,00: 18.00: 0.00: 0.00:
12: I: 1.0000 : -17,11: 17.11: 0.00: 0._ =
13: I: 1.0000 : "16.:;rI_: 16.9: O,O0: 0._:
1&: I: 1.0000 : -I$._: 15.34: 0.00: 0.00:
15: 1: t.0000 : -14.7_: l&.;"_: 0.00: 0.00:
16: I: 1.0000 : -I]._: 13._: 0.00: 0.00:
17: 1: 1.0000 : -13.27: 13.27: 0.00: 0.00:
18: I: 1.0000 : -1Z.69: 12.69: 0.00: 0.00:
19: I: 1.0000 : -12.10: 12.10: 0.00: 0.00:
ZO: I: 1.0_ : -11.50: 11.50: 0.00: 0.0(]:
21: I: 1.0000 : -10,92: I0._: 0.00: 0.00:
Z2: I: 1.0000 : -I0..32: 10.32: 0.00: 0.00:
?._t: I: 1.0000 : -9.7t,: 9.74: 0.00: 0.00:
2_.: 1: !.0000 : -9./,_: 9.t.J.: 0.00: 0.00:
25: I: 1.0000 : -8.85: 8.85: 0.00: 0.00:
Erwtronmentmt Cra¢_ Grovt_ Check for Sustained
(l_nsx Less than _;scc): _3T SET
.... .4.
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SLOC¢ Fr,AL FL_W SlZE K _U_
STEP A C A-rIP C-T%P
I :.203562 0.203516 IS.596960 17.273901
Z :.207259 0.207169 15._5 17._7&0
3 _.211099 0.210971 15.3,_740 17.6006_7
4 :,Z_S094 0.2_4930 16._-"P'J_S 1T.77187_
5 0.219253 0.219058 16.1_274 17.9¢_13
6 3.2Z.358_ 0.27.3369 16._2353 18.131850
7 3.228115 0.2278?6 16.507128 1S.321431
8 :.2325_6 0.232596 16.67/_120 18.518053
9 0.237801 0._44 16.855503 18.7222715
10 0.242.998 0.24274.4 17.04,0113 18.934739
11 O.Z_ 0.2_8219 17._2_53 19.15614J_
ADVI_I_Y: [STIMATED NET SECTION STRESS > YIELI) STRENGTN.
AT CTCLE NO. O. OF LOAD STEP NO. 1 OF ilLOC_ NIO. 12
CJtJtC_ SlZE A • 0.2{=8,460 AI¢ • 1.00097
#
I;' 0.254212 0.253996 17. 4332t, J_ 19.3_7363
13 0.Z60284 O. 260106 17.543307 19.629341
14 0.266711 0.266587 17.363590 19._83217
15 O. Z7'_535 0.2734_ 18. C'9_.4G_6 ZO . I/._L_;_8
16 O. 2Z_06 0.280852 18.333973 20.42.5811
17 O.2MSS? 0.2M759 18.589698 20. TZ0937
18 0 .Z96957 _J.297_M, 18.859843 21 . 03 _:_9_8
19 0.306009 0.3065/,6 19. 147998 21 .,!,6597_J
20 0.3158_I_8 0.31&MM] 19. _,S_4S 21._593
FINAL RESULTS:
Ur_staO(e crm¢_ growth, _x stress int_iW excee¢_ ¢r{t|ca[ v|tt._:
_x = 22.02 < ¢r • 22.00
AT C_CLE NO. I. OF LOAD STEP NO. I OF SLOC_ )#0. 21
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